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Objective: To determine whether the marks in the third year Objective Structured Clinical Examination
(OSCE) were affected by the collusion reported by the students themselves on an electronic discussion
board.
Design: A review of the student discussion, examiners’ feedback and a comparison of the marks obtained
on the 2 days of the OSCE.
Participants: 255 third year medical students.
Setting: An OSCE consisting of 15 stations, administered on three sites over 2 days at a UK medical
school.
Results: 40 students contributed to the discussion on the electronic discussion board. The main points
raised were perceived inequity between students who did, or did not, have prior knowledge of the station
content, and the lack of honesty and professionalism of their peers. Most contributors claimed to have
received, or knew of others receiving, prior knowledge, but none confessed to passing on information. No
significant difference (p = 0.16) was observed in the overall mark for the OSCE on day 1 (mean 390 (SD
37)) and day 2 (mean 397 (38)). On day 2, marks were considerably greater for four stations and
markedly lower for three stations. It was not obvious why collusion should affect these station marks. A
clear indication of the effects of collusion could only be obtained from a single subsection of an individual
station (pathology) where 82 students on day 2 incorrectly gave the diagnosis from day 1.
Conclusion: Marks do not provide a sound inference of student collusion in an OSCE and may mask the
aspects of professional development of students.
H
igher education institutions are paying increased
attention to academic dishonesty among their stu-
dents. Although cheating under any circumstances is a
serious regulatory matter, its importance on courses leading
to professional status is arguably greater. The General
Medical Council states that doctors should be honest and
trustworthy; so a question mark hangs over the suitability of
any student found guilty of cheating for entry into the
profession.1 Because little is known about the career
trajectories of students who transgress ethical codes, a link
between student dishonesty and future professional lapses
cannot be assumed, however plausible the association may
seem. Limited evidence from self-reported data from engi-
neering students in the US points to an association between
cheating in high school or college and in the workplace.2
Universities therefore experience dilemmas when dealing
with instances of cheating in medical schools.
For obvious reasons, it is difficult to estimate the frequency
of occurrence of clandestine behaviour such as cheating.3 On
a limited evidence base, cheating among medical students
appears to be neither new nor confined to particular
cultures,3–10 although the introduction of information tech-
nology, cultural norms3 7 and mismatches between student
and faculty perceptions11 have been claimed as contributory.
In the main, reports either describe specific incidents9 10 or
depend on self-reported data from questionnaire surveys that
reflect student experience and intention.5–8 In some studies,
the frequency of observations of cheating, or intentions to
cheat, increased with seniority, suggesting that increasing
experience of medical school is accompanied by the develop-
ment of more relaxed peer norms towards academic
misconduct.6–8
In 2000, the BMJ reported the management of a student
caught cheating during a clinical finals examination at a
London medical school.10 Among the many responses was an
anonymous confessional, from ‘‘recent graduates’’ of a UK
medical school, describing collusion on a major scale in
relation to an Objective Structured Clinical Examination
(OSCE).12 Students had gained sight of a marking sheet
2 days before the exam and disseminated the information,
enabling recipients to revise selectively for the OSCE. A
greater number of merits and distinctions were awarded that
year.
There is genuine uncertainty about whether advance notice
of content advantages a candidate sitting a performance
assessment. The evidence from the literature is far from clear.
Several studies have examined scores when similar OSCEs
are administered over periods varying from days to 3 months
and have shown that overall score trends do not rise over
time.13–18 In two of these studies, accompanying self-reported
data confirmed that students had discussed station content
between administrations of OSCEs, although the nature of
the interactions was not investigated.13 17 In another study, in
which students were officially encouraged to discuss exam
content, there was no evidence of rising scores over time.19
Contrary reports exist, however, of rising trends in overall
marks with successive OSCE administrations20 21 and, in a
repeat of their initial study,14 Colliver et al22 analysed within
station scores and showed that some component items did
exhibit rising trends even when overall scores did not. In
cases where OSCE stations have been reused over longer
intervals of a year, the evidence supports rising scores over
time.23 24
The assumptions underlying these studies require closer
scrutiny. Some assume that advance notice of station content
will advantage candidates, resulting in higher scores for them
Abbreviation: OSCE, Objective Structured Clinical Examination
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than their peers. From this arises the claim that a trend for a
rising score in a cohort reflects a potential breach of exam
security and, conversely, that finding consistent scores over
time indicates that no major violation of exam security has
occurred.13 14 16–19 The alternative view, that advance informa-
tion can disadvantage candidates, resulting in lower marks
over time, is considered, but features less prominently.15 20 22
If information about content has the potential to either
advantage or disadvantage a candidate, then inferences
relating to trends in overall marks of the peer group to
collusion become unreliable. Even consistent mean marks
over time cannot be taken to indicate that exam security has
been maintained.22 Detecting breaches of test security,
particularly at the individual level, becomes difficult, if not
impossible, under these circumstances. In addition, a focus
on marks has seemingly diverted attention from the ethical
implications of collusion and its potential significance for the
development of professionalism in undergraduate students.
AIMS
Against this background, we describe a critical incident that
occurred in a UK medical school, in which student collusion
at a third year OSCE was seen on a staff–student electronic
discussion board. We consider the incident to be of wider
relevance and interest owing to the many issues that it raises
for students, teachers and educational institutions, in which
the OSCE format is used in the assessment programme.
We aim to:
N describe the incident, its management and consequences
for the school;
N challenge the view that trends in overall means or station
marks, derived from sequential OSCE sittings, provide a
sound basis for the presence or absence of collusion; and
N discuss ethical issues arising out of collusion from student
and staff perspectives.
Because this paper relates to events in real time, which do
not conform easily to the predetermined character of a
research study, the following structure has been chosen:
N a description of the incident in context;
N a description of the staff response to the incident; and
N an analysis of OSCE marks.
CRITICAL INCIDENT
OSCE implementation
In all, 255 third year students sat for a summative OSCE
consisting of 15 stations of 10 min each. The exam was
conducted at three different sites over 2 consecutive days,
resulting in three sittings per day at each site. Table 1
describes the individual station tasks and any intended
variations between days 1 and 2. Marking sheets were
standardised and the standard for scores was set using the
Angoff method.
Students taking the OSCE on day 1 were explicitly advised
not to pass on information about the exam to students at
later sittings. Steps were taken to avoid successive groups of
candidates talking to one another, although it was impossible
to prevent day 1 and 2 students communicating during the
assessment period.
Electronic discussion board
The medical school runs a series of password-protected,
electronic discussion boards, organised by year of study,
which are accessible to staff and students in the school. Less
than 2 h after the end of the day 2 OSCE, students initiated a
discussion about collusion between day 1 and 2 students,
which continued until the publication of results 12 days later.
Nearly 40 students contributed, about three quarters of
whom remained anonymous.
The main topic was the perceived lack of equity between
those students who had, and had not, received insider
information about OSCE content. Students without insider
information argued that colluding students retained an
advantage over the rest of their colleagues, which devalued
the achievements of honest students and the assessment
process. There was concern that honesty was not being
rewarded. Several posts criticised their peer’s dishonesty and
its potential effect on professionalism and future practice.
Although students reported either receiving insider informa-
tion themselves or knowing of someone who had, no one
confessed to conveying information. Those receiving insider
information disclaimed any advantage, but others reported
studying relevant electronic learning resources and memoris-
ing names of drug in the interim. Clearly, collusion had
occurred between students sitting the OSCE on the same day,
as well as on different days.
Staff response
Under the circumstances, staff thought it imperative to
respond to events, as the electronic discussion board is
publicly accessible to the entire school. Although students
who use the facility may elect to remain anonymous, staff
reserves the right to uncover the identity of any student who
fails to maintain proper standards. Staff associated with the
Table 1 Description of the Objective Structured Clinical
Examination stations in order of question consistency
between days 1 and 2
Station blueprint Station task
Question
consistency on
days 1 and 2
Gastrointestinal system Physical examination Identical
Locomotor system Physical examination Identical
Cardiovascular system Physical examination Identical
Respiratory system History taking Identical
Locomotor system:
diagnosis and
management
Video Identical
Written Q and A
Pharmacology Prescribing for different
scenarios on medicines
sheet
Identical
Ethics Discuss smoking
cessation during
pregnancy
Identical
Practical skills Connecting intravenous
fluids
Identical
Communication skills Diagnosis from written
scenario and interview
about alcohol
consumption
Different scenario
and diagnosis on
days 1 and 2
Resuscitation Basic life support Half was identical
in addition
Day 1: defibrillation
Day 2: airway
management
Pathology Written Q and A on
specimens
Identical questions:
specimens varied
Anatomy Written Q and A on
scenarios and
specimens and x rays
Identical questions:
specimens varied
Microbiology Written Q and A on
cultures, x rays and
treatment
Identical questions:
specimens varied
ECG Written Q and A on
interpretation of
electrocardiograms
Different questions
and traces
Radiology Interpretation of x rays Different questions
and x rays
ECG, electrocardiogram; Q and A, questions and answers.
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OSCE vigorously debated appropriate responses to the
incident. Reprimanding students who had admitted receiving
advance information was considered, but was narrowly
rejected on the following grounds. Firstly, no student had
admitted passing on information and these students were
arguably as guilty as those who received information. Also,
students would probably not divulge the names of infor-
mants. Secondly, the discussion board thread probably
represented only the tip of the iceberg and the collusion
may have been more widespread. Further problems arose
from the interpretation of electronic interaction: without
clues of non-verbal behaviour, irony and sarcasm are difficult
to differentiate from factual statements.
Staff recognised that targeting the students who contrib-
uted to the discussion would make scapegoats of a few,
whereas others, perhaps many more, would evade censure.
Instead, they chose to post a response to all third year
students on the electronic discussion board, dealing with
some of the students’ misconceptions about the implementa-
tion of the OSCE, recognising the inequity of the situation
and promising to work towards a form of implementation
that reduced opportunities for collusion to uphold the honest
students. It was emphasised that the policy of non-disclosure
of exam content would continue to remain an offence under
the current assessment regulations.
RESULTS ANALYSIS
In the light of the student discussion, we reviewed the OSCE
marks. The mean and SD for each day, differences in means
(day 22day 1) and the 95% confidence interval for the
difference were calculated for the overall mark and the marks
for each station (table 2). The day 1 and 2 marks were
compared using the two sample t test (SPSS V.13). Although
multiple comparisons were carried out, a Bonferroni correc-
tion was considered to be inappropriate because of the lack of
independence of the overall mark and the station marks.
Caution is therefore required when interpreting the reported
p values.
The small increase in the mean overall mark between days
1 and 2 was not significant at the 0.05 level. For individual
stations, roughly half showed significant differences between
the average marks on the two days. It was impossible to
attribute these findings to collusion, however, because other
influences contributed to the average station mark. These
included variations in examiners, student ability and case
specificity arising from the participation of different patients
at different sittings.25 Secondly, analysis of the results from
all students sitting the exam on a specific day reflects an
average effect for the class. If only a few students colluded
then the effect would be masked by the results from the large
majority who did not. Thirdly, collusion can affect the mark
positively or negatively and the overall effect is diluted when
considering the average values. Finally, the mark for an
individual station was the sum of multiple sections, each of
which may have been affected in opposite ways by collusion.
For instance, a student may only lose or gain 2 marks out of
40 for a specific item. Thus, analysis of the marks for
individual stations was not reliable for detecting or quantify-
ing collusion.
We therefore decided to look in detail at the marks from
those stations where examiners had commented sponta-
neously, without prompting by staff inquiries, that they had
suspicions of collusion for their particular station
(Communication skills, Pathology).
Communication skil ls
Examiners of the Communication skills station commented
verbally to one of the authors (GL-J) that they had noted that
day 2 students were offering the day 1 diagnosis, despite
changes to the station scenario. Attempts to analyse the
component items of the Communication skills answer sheets
were foiled because the marks awarded for supplying the
correct diagnosis were aggregated with marks for other
aspects of the student-simulated patient interaction. It was
therefore not possible to either support or refute the
examiners’ assertions of collusion.
Pathology
We were alerted to possible collusion in the Pathology station
by the examiners’ formal feedback comments, which were
posted on the third year website. The examiners stated that
‘‘It seems possible that collusion was a confounding factor in
day 2 answers to the second part of the question. The
histology picture changed from tuberculosis on day 1 to
squamous carcinoma on day 2.’’
At this station, the scenario, questions and marking
schedule were unchanged on days 1 and 2; only the
photomicrograph specimen was changed (day 1 tuberculosis
Table 2 Total and stations scores for days 1 and 2
Station Day 1 Day 2 Mean differences (95% CI) p Value
n 128 127
Total score 389.9 (36.8) 396.5 (38.3) 6.6 (22.66 to 15.9) 0.162
Stations with questions consistent between days
Gastrointestinal system 30.5 (4.4) 31.1 (4.7) 0.7 (20.4 to 1.8) 0.236
Locomotor system 28.8 (6.8) 28.0 (6.6) 20.9 (22.5 to 0.8) 0.311
Cardiovascular system 30.4 (4.7) 28.5 (5.0) 21.8 (23.0 to 20.6) 0.003
Respiratory system 27.8 (4.6) 29.4 (4.8) 1.6 (0.5 to 2.8) 0.006
Locomotor system: diagnosis and management 25.6 (5.8) 29.7 (5.4) 4.1 (2.7 to 5.5) 0.000
Pharmacology 16.1 (6.0) 17.0 (6.8) 0.8 (20.8 to 2.4) 0.314
Ethics 27.8 (4.7) 27.1 (5.0) 20.7 (21.9 to 0.4) 0.220
Practical skill 27.3 (6.1) 27.7 (6.4) 0.4 (21.2 to 1.9) 0.643
Stations with questions partially changed between days
Communication skills 29.1 (5.4) 26.7 (5.5) 22.4 (23.8 to 21.01) 0.001
Resuscitation 30.0 (5.3) 32.0 (4.4) 2.0 (0.7 to 3.2) 0.002
Stations with questions changed between days
Pathology 26.4 (6.4) 24.5 (5.3) 21.9 (23.4 to 20.5) 0.010
Anatomy 19.7 (4.5) 24.0 (4.4) 4.3 (3.2 to 5.4) 0.000
Microbiology 19.6 (6.9) 20.8 (6.5) 1.1 (20.5 to 2.8) 0.179
ECG 26.4 (7.5) 26.2 (6.0) 20.2 (21.9 to 1.5) 0.820
Radiology 24.1 (5.1) 23.6 (5.3) 20.5 (21.7 to 0.8) 0.483
Data are given as means and (SD) unless otherwise specified.
ECG, electrocardiogram.
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and day 2 squamous carcinoma). The number of correct and
incorrect answers for the diagnosis given each day was
counted, the results of which are summarised in fig 1. The
findings are congruent with collusion between day 1 and day
2 students.
DISCUSSION
These findings challenge the view that trends in overall mean
or station marks, derived from sequential OSCE sittings,
provide a sound assumption for the presence or absence of
collusion. Instead, they support the later work of Colliver et
al22 in showing the need to examine specific station
component items, when searching for breaches of test
security. The incident also supports the contention that
collusion has the power to disadvantage rather than to
benefit students who indulge in collusion.15 20 The two
premises, that overall marks are insufficiently sensitive as
indicators of collusion, and the uncertain effect of advance
notice on marks, go some way in explaining the variations in
previous studies.
Some may criticise our conclusions on the grounds that the
Pathology question preferentially tested knowledge rather
than skills, as knowledge is easier to reproduce at short
notice. There is some truth in this, but it is only partial.
Although the OSCE is promoted as a skill-based assessment,
skill must be constructed on, and integrated with, knowledge
if it is to be of value in educating the safe, competent
professional. Representing skills and knowledge as entirely
different entities is unhelpful when, in reality, the relation-
ship is far more complex. Furthermore, the anecdotal
evidence from the Communication skills examiners shows
how a station, perceived primarily as a skills test, is not
immune to collusion.
It is reassuring that the marks awarded for the specific
items are small and, standing alone, would have little effect
on the outcome. It is, however, possible for multiple small
breaches to have a cumulative effect for an individual
student, which would probably go undetected. From the
perspectives of the staff and honest students, there is comfort
in knowing that malpractice was apparently not rewarded in
this case. Yet, the incident threw up difficult issues for staff
in handling the public, yet anonymous, electronic report and
in protecting honest students. This is probably not an isolated
case. When this incident was reported at a recent interna-
tional conference in medical education, many members of
the audience from around the world related similar experi-
ences.
We describe below amendments to the OSCE aimed at
reducing opportunities for collusion but, in reality, it will be
impossible to block the flow of information, particularly
electronic texting and emails. Trusting students will always
be necessary when OSCEs are repeated day after day.
Although plagiarism can be detected by software, detection
of collusion in performance examinations presents an
altogether more difficult problem. The deliberate inclusion
of questions designed to test the possibility of collusion is one
option for consideration. Colliver et al22 follow a similar
strategy in suggesting an examination of working diagnosis
scores in the context of a simulated-patient examination in
the US.
Steps have since been taken to modify the OSCE format to
reduce opportunities for collusion. The OSCE is now divided
into two halves, each one being administered on one day
only. One half consists of clinically based stations, involving
interaction with simulated and real patients; the other is
delivered via computer and includes questions on patient
management, data handling and analysis, and interpretation
of investigations. Although this will not exclude the
possibility of collusion, it will reduce the opportunities for it.
For institutions, the more difficult problem is upholding
honesty and protecting students who do not cheat, for they
can feel disregarded by the system. From this incident and
other reports, it seems that students are concerned about
collusion and cheating, but may lack opportunities to voice
their opinions.10 12 Possibly, the anonymous protection
afforded by the discussion board may have encouraged
students to speak out in this instance. To discourage
cheating, Glick3 proposes that schools carefully articulate
their expectations of students and take positive, public steps
to encourage a culture in which unethical behaviour simply
becomes unacceptable. Otherwise, there is the danger that
turning a blind eye, however unintentional, may encourage
the growth of undesirable norms in which peer group loyalty
overtakes professional ethics. It is in this spirit that we report
the incident, to publicise the uncertain effects of collusion in
relation to OSCEs and to open a debate about these issues in
relation to current OSCE implementation practices.
CONCLUSION
Although research examining the effects of collusion on
OSCE marks has been conducted, there is little information
about the nature of collusion and its ethical implications. An
incident of collusion at a UK school showed that it could
disadvantage students, although its effect on marks appeared
to be limited. Honest students raised ethical concerns about
cheating colleagues and the possible effect on their future
professional practice. In the absence of any evidence against
individual students, the school issued a public statement
and has since modified the implementation of the OSCE to
reduce opportunities for cheating. The potential influence of
these issues on the development of social and cultural
norms in medical school culture has been considered. In view
of the global popularity of the OSCE format for assessing
professional competence, these findings may have wider
relevance.
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allocation considered from a lawyer’s point of
view. It described resource allocation as a
problem in the reasonable and legally accoun-
table administration of a set of public bodies,
rather than as a problem in clinical medicine,
economics or moral philosophy. As such it was
a very important contribution to a vexed field,
and did much to clarify debates, at least in the
academic field.
This second edition is therefore to be warmly
welcomed. The NHS has undergone an even
more extensive change since the first edition
was published, under the banner of moder-
nisation. Of particular importance from the
point of view of resource allocation are the
arrival of the National Institute for Clinical
Excellence, the reorganisation of healthcare
commissioning around primary care trusts
and, within medical science, the rise of
evidence-based medicine and the arrival of
new, highly expensive classes of drugs for
treating chronic diseases.
The approach taken by the author in the
second edition is to consider the nature of
resource allocation itself, then to look in detail
at how resource allocation can be carried out
through clinical judgement, expert guidelines,
government regulation and direct democratic
decision making. He then goes on to look at
how the NHS is managed, considering, rightly,
that the most important resource allocation
decisions are taken at the mid-range level of
primary care and hospital budgeting. He
describes the current structure of the NHS in
some detail, identifying the scope of the
different powers that lie with different tiers
or centres of decision making and the role
these have in resource allocation. The bulk of
the book is then devoted in turn to the analysis
of review by the courts of administrative
decisions relating to the allocation of resources,
medical negligence law (whether rationing can
create a case for action in negligence by
causing the care offered to fall below a proper
standard of care), the relationship between
local decision makers and government policy,
and governance and accountability processes.
An important final chapter looks at the
regulation of care provided under the auspices
of the NHS by non-NHS providers at home and
overseas.
The analysis and arguments are presented
with admirable clarity and should be fully
accessible to non-lawyers. However the struc-
ture of the NHS changes in the near future,
short of outright privatisation, this book will
remain a valuable guide to the issues of policy
and practice.
Compared with the first edition, this edition
is shorter and more focused on the guiding
principles of the law and public policy in this
area. The first edition was longer by about a
quarter, and included chapters on complaints
and professional discipline and on access to
medical records (considered as means to make
NHS decisions accountable to patients) as well
as a more detailed treatment of the then
effective ‘‘internal market’’. There was also
some discussion of the relationship of resource
allocation decisions with decisions about the
value of life and end-of-life care. Most of this is
missing from the second edition. This makes it
a more focused book and one with a longer
shelf life in view of likely changes in the NHS.
However, scholars would be advised to keep
their first editions on their shelves, as some of
the now omitted material remains of both
historical and intellectual interest. The new
book has gained in focus and grasp of general
principles, but has lost some of the ‘‘black
letter’’ lawyer’s attention to detail.
Overall, this as an important and fascinating
book which deserves a wide readership among
students, practitioners, managers, policy
makers and lawyers. No work on resource
allocation can overlook it.
R E Ashcroft
CORRECT IONS
doi: 10.1136/jme.2005.013904corr1
An error has occurred on page 569 in the
October issue, in the paper titled Decisions at
the end of life: an empirical study on the
involvement, legal understanding and ethical
views of pre registration house officers (J Med
Ethics 2006;32:567–70). Line 24 in the right
hand column should read ‘‘of intravenous
hydration to be morally appropriate, even…’’.
The journal apologises for this error.
doi: 10.1136/jme.2005.14720corr1
In the paper titled, Distributive justice in
screening for hearing in newborns (J Med
Ethics 2006;32:588–91), an error has occurred
in line 8 of the second paragraph. The correct
sentence is, ‘‘These approaches are unlikely to
diminish the resources available to other
healthcare needs inequitably and they may in
fact result in raising the overall standard of
healthcare across the communities.’’
doi: 10.1136/jme.2005.15446corr1
In the paper titled, The objective structured
clinical examination and student collusion:
marks do not tell the whole truth (J Med
Ethics 2006;32:734–9), the initial for the author
Kenneth E Boyd is incorrect. It should be
Kenneth M Boyd. The journal apologises for
this error.
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